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Over the past 10 years, debates on global health have paid in-creasing attention to the importance of health care systems, which encom-pass the institutions, organizations, and resources (physical, financial, and 
human) assembled to deliver health care services that meet population needs. It has 
become especially important to emphasize health care systems in low- and middle-
income countries because of the substantial external funding provided for disease-
specific programs, especially for drugs and medical supplies, and the relative under-
funding of the broader health care infrastructures in these countries.1 A function ing 
health care system is fundamental to the achievement of universal coverage for 
health care, which has been the focus of recent statements by advocacy groups 
and other organizations around the globe, including a declaration by the United 
Nations in 2012.2
Recent analyses have drawn attention to the weaknesses of health care systems 
in low- and middle-income countries. For example, in the 75 countries that account 
for more than 95% of maternal and child deaths, the median proportion of births 
attended by a skilled health worker is only 62% (range, 10 to 100%), and women 
without money or coverage for this service are much less likely to receive it than 
are women with the means to pay for it.3 Lack of financial protection for the costs 
of health care means that approximately 100 million people are pushed below the 
poverty line each year by payments for health care,4 and many more will not seek 
care because they lack the necessary funds.
In response to such deficiencies in the health care system, a number of countries 
and their partners in development have been introducing new approaches to financ-
ing, organizing, and delivering health care. This article briefly reviews the main 
weaknesses of health care systems in low- and middle-income countries, lists the 
most common responses to those weaknesses, and then presents three of the most 
popular responses for further review. These responses, which have attracted consid-
erable controversy, involve the questions of whether to pay for health care through 
general taxation or contributory insurance funds to improve financial protection 
for specific sections of the population, whether to use financial incentives to in-
crease health care utilization and improve health care quality, and whether to 
make use of private entities to extend the reach of the health care system.
This review draws on what is now quite an extensive literature on the deficien-
cies of health care systems1 and on the Health Systems Evidence database.5 How-
ever, the poor quality and uneven coverage of evidence on the strengthening of 
health care systems means that evidence of deficiencies is stronger than evidence 
of remedies. Moreover, the specific circumstances of individual countries strongly 
influence both decisions about which approaches might be relevant and their suc-
cess, so any generalizations made from health systems research in particular coun-
tries must be carefully considered.6 It is unlikely that there is one single blueprint 
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for an ideal health care system design or a magic 
bullet that will automatically remedy deficiencies. 
The strengthening of health care systems in low- 
and middle-income countries must be seen as a 
long-term developmental process.
He a lth C a r e S ys tem Cons tr a in t s 
a nd R esponses
A framework for categorizing the constraints on 
health care systems7 was originally developed in 
2001 for the Commission on Macroeconomics and 
Health of the World Health Organization and 
has been widely applied since then. This frame-
work has the merit of looking at systems both 
horizontally (e.g., assessing each level to deter-
mine all the elements needed for effective service 
delivery) and vertically (e.g., accounting for the 
support functions of the higher levels in a sys-
tem). Table 1 lists six levels that exist within any 
health care system, from the community level to 
the global level; the main constraints of the sys-
tem at each level; and the main responses to 
these constraints. Three issues drawn from these 
responses have been selected for detailed consid-
eration below.
These issues have been selected for several 
reasons. They involve critical functions of the 
health care system (i.e., financing and health care 
delivery), receive considerable prominence in inter-
national debates on how to strengthen the health 
care system, and have been evaluated somewhat 
more rigorously than other issues.
General Taxation vs. Contributory Insurance
As indicated in Table 1, a major problem in low- 
and middle-income countries is lack of financial 
support for those who need health care, deter-
ring service use and burdening household bud-
gets. Figure 1 shows the sources of health care 
financing according to country income. On aver-
age, almost 50% of health care financing in low-
income countries comes from out-of-pocket pay-
ments, as compared with 30% in middle-income 
countries and 14% in high-income countries. When 
payments from general government expenditures, 
social (public) health insurance, and prepaid pri-
vate insurance are combined, only 38% of health 
care financing in low-income countries is com-
bined in funding pools, which allow the risks of 
health care costs to be shared across population 
groups, as compared with approximately 60% 
in middle-income countries and 80% in high-
income countries.
Thus, the key financing issue for low- and 
middle-income countries is how to provide in-
creased financial protection for households. That 
part of the population in the formal sector of em-
ployment, in which payroll taxes can be levied, 
could be included in social insurance arrange-
ments. It is also commonly accepted that the 
poorest people require complete subsidization 
for health care costs from general taxation, and 
those with low incomes need at least partial 
subsidization. The key question is whether the 
rest of the population — those who are outside 
the formal sector of the economy but who are not 
the very poorest — should be covered by funds 
raised through general taxation or encouraged to 
enroll in contributory insurance programs.
This issue has been at the core of debates on 
the financing of universal coverage in South and 
Southeast Asia.11 The Philippines and Vietnam, 
for instance, have sought to expand financial pro-
tection by encouraging voluntary enrollment in 
social health insurance programs, whereas other 
countries, such as Thailand, have used funds from 
general taxation that are channeled to ministries 
of health or local health authorities. The recent 
report from the High Level Expert Group on Uni-
versal Health Coverage, which was charged by 
the Indian Planning Commission to develop a 
blueprint for achieving universal coverage in India 
by 2020, recommended channeling considerably 
increased funding from general tax revenue to 
largely public providers through a public purchaser 
at the state level. The report is clear in its rejec-
tion of contributory insurance arrangements.12
In Africa, Rwanda is frequently referred to as 
a country that has achieved remarkably high vol-
untary insurance coverage,13 although the depth 
of coverage (i.e., the number of services covered) 
is limited and there is still insufficient financial 
protection for the poorest groups. Ghana, another 
African country cited for its efforts to expand 
health care coverage, introduced a national health 
insurance program in which enrollment is com-
pulsory for the formal sector and voluntary for 
the informal sector and in which coverage is free 
for the poorest members of the population. How-
ever, problems in making premiums affordable 
and in maintaining voluntary enrollment led the 
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Table 1. Health Care System Constraints and Responses.*
Level of Health 
Care System Constraints† Responses‡
Community and 
household
Lack of demand for effective interventions Provide financial incentives to encourage use of services, 
mobilize communities (e.g., by supporting creation 
of women’s groups to spread information about 
 antenatal and delivery services)
Barriers to use of effective interventions (physical,  
financial, social)
Expand “close-to-client” services (e.g., those provided by 
village health workers and trained drug sellers), re-
move financial barriers at point of service through in-
creased prepayment, increase responsiveness of pro-
viders (e.g., through pay-for-performance approaches)
Service delivery Shortage and poor distribution of appropriately qualified 
staff, especially at primary care level
Increase numbers of health workers, implement task 
shifting (e.g., by training community health workers 
to treat common illnesses), increase allowances for 
work in remote areas
Low staff pay and poor motivation Increase pay, improve supervision
Weak technical guidance, program management,  
and supervision
Strengthen training and supervision, contract management
Inadequate drugs and medical supplies Strengthen public systems of supply, make use of private 
retail system
Lack of equipment and infrastructure, including poor  
accessibility of health services
Renovate, upgrade, and expand public facilities, contract 
nongovernmental organizations to provide services
Policy and strategic 
management in 
the health sector
Weak and overly centralized systems for planning  
and management
Decentralize planning and management
Weak drug policies and supply systems Introduce new supply mechanisms
Inadequate regulation of pharmaceutical industry and 
other segments of the private sector, improper  
industry practices
Strengthen regulation through legal mechanisms and  
incentives
Lack of cooperative action and partnership for health  
between government and civic organizations
Require engagement of civic organizations in planning 
and service oversight
Weak incentives to use inputs efficiently and to respond 
to user needs and preferences
Use output-based payments and external assistance 
 programs
Fragmented donor funding, which reduces flexibility  
and ownership; low priority given to systems support
Implement reforms to aid management and delivery 
(e.g., SWAPS, IHP+), provide increased financing  
for systems support
Government policy Bureaucracy (e.g., civil service rules and remuneration, 
centralized management systems)
Make greater use of private sector in financing, manage-
ment, and service delivery; move health management 
into autonomous agencies
Limited communication and transport infrastructure Not seen as health care issue
Political and physical 
environment
Governance and overall policy framework (e.g., corruption, 
weak government, weak rule of law and enforceability 
of contracts, political instability and insecurity, social 
sectors not given priority in funding decisions, weak 
structure for public accountability, lack of free press)
Encourage improved stewardship and accountability 
mechanisms by encouraging growth in civic organi-
zations and supporting an active and informed media
Climatic and geographic predisposition to disease,  
physical environment unfavorable for service delivery
Not amenable to change
Global Fragmented governance and management structures  
for global health
Improve global coordination (e.g., the Paris Declaration, 
Accra Agenda for Action)
Emigration of doctors and nurses to high-income 
 countries
Seek voluntary agreements on migration of doctors and 
nurses
* IHP+ denotes International Health Partnership Plus, and SWAPS sectorwide approaches.
† Information is adapted from Hanson et al.7
‡ Information is adapted from Mills and Ranson,8 Mills et al.,9 and the Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems.1
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ruling party to propose one-time payment rather 
than annual payment from those outside the for-
mal sector.14 General taxation (through a value-
added tax) is already the main financing source 
for Ghana’s national health insurance, but the 
introduction of a one-time payment would clearly 
signal a decrease in the importance attached to 
contributory insurance.
Given the limited tax base in low- and middle-
income countries and the limited ability of many 
households to pay for health care, whether di-
rectly or through contributory insurance, progress 
toward improved financial protection will inevi-
tably be gradual. Countries need to and do draw 
on a mix of financing sources, but their key 
concern should be to determine which financing 
arrangements, given their particular economic, 
social, and political environment, will best protect 
the most vulnerable segment of the population 
and ensure both breadth of coverage (the num-
ber of people protected) and reasonable depth of 
coverage.
Financial Incentives for Households  
and Providers
A second key issue in efforts to strengthen health 
systems has been whether to deploy financial in-
centives as a way of encouraging households to 
use services and encouraging providers to deliver 
services of good quality. Such strategies form part 
of a wider approach known as results-based fi-
nancing, “pay for performance,” or output-based 
aid,15 which is intended to address the problems 
of lack of demand for effective interventions and 
poor responsiveness and motivation on the part 
of providers. Incentives can be targeted to the re-
cipients of health care (e.g., through vouchers or 
cash payments conditional on the use of services) 
or to individual health care workers or health care 
facilities.
An overview16 of systematic reviews of the ef-
fectiveness of such financial incentives suggests 
some successes in the short run for incentives 
targeting recipients of health care and individual 
health care workers and seeking to achieve dis-
tinct, well-defined behavioral goals related to the 
provision and use of fairly simple services. For 
example, in Latin America, the use of conditional 
cash transfers has been associated with increased 
use of preventive services,17 and in Rwanda, per-
formance-based payment of primary care provid-
ers has increased the number of babies delivered 
in hospitals or other facilities and preventive care 
visits by young children.18 But the limited evidence 
base provides little guidance on how well such 
programs may work in other countries. There is 
concern as to whether the programs can be dif-
ficult to implement in countries with limited 
resources where the governments lack the staff, 
skills, and systems to manage and monitor ser-
vices, payments, and performance. This was the 
case with a maternity incentive payment in Nepal,19 
where the “less poor” benefited more than the 
poor.20 Further concerns are whether changes will 
be sustained over time and whether incentives are 
also useful for more complex services.
Financial incentives are powerful, and unde-
sirable responses, though rarely investigated, are 
likely to occur. For instance, a recent analysis of 
what is probably the world’s largest demand-side 
incentive program promoting hospital births, 
India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana, indicated that al-
though the provision of cash incentives increased 
women’s access to services, it was also associated 
with an increase in fertility.21
Financial incentives represent just one means 
of improving levels of health care utilization and 
the quality of services, but virtually no studies in 
low- and middle-income countries have compared 
the use of financial incentives with alternative 
ways of achieving these outcomes,16 such as non-
financial approaches to changing professional 
behavior.22,23 This lack of information on alter-
native approaches makes it difficult to develop 
clear policy recommendations.
2 1
25
40
1 2
9
18
48
30
32
14
35
57
30
4
22
14 11
6
So
ur
ce
 o
f H
ea
lth
 C
ar
e 
Fi
na
nc
in
g 
(%
) 100
80
90
70
60
40
30
10
50
20
0
Low
Income
Lower
Middle
Income
Upper
Middle
Income
High
Income
Private prepaid plans
Social health insurance
Territorial government
Other private sources
Out of pocket
Figure 1. Sources of Health Care Financing According to Country Income.
Data are from the World Health Organization.10
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Use of Private Entities to Extend Coverage
There is extensive private participation in the 
health care systems of low- and middle-income 
countries, especially in service delivery. The private 
sector ranges from a limited number of formal 
not-for-profit and for-profit providers to numer-
ous informal providers, including itinerant drug 
sellers. There has been an increase in the number 
of private providers, driven both by rising incomes 
and the failure of public services to meet expec-
tations. This situation has led to the pragmatic 
argument that since such private providers are 
available, they should be harnessed to address 
the physical inaccessibility of services, the short-
age and maldistribution of staff, and inadequate 
stocks of drugs and supplies (Table 1).
There is indeed evidence that introducing shop-
keeper training, drug packaging, and franchising 
can improve the quality of private services used 
by the poor, especially services provided at retail 
drug outlets.24 The training of drug sellers on the 
Kenyan coast, for instance, has increased the pro-
portion of sales of antimalarial drugs that contain 
an adequate dose,25 and the channeling of arte-
misinin-based combination therapies through pri-
vate-sector outlets (by means of the Affordable 
Medicines Facility–Malaria initiative) has helped 
to increase the availability of quality-assured drugs 
in six pilot countries.26 However, private retail 
markets appear to vary greatly from one country 
to another, and the evidence base is too limited to 
draw general conclusions.
It has been argued that given the failure or 
capacity limitations of public-sector efforts, the 
more formal private sector can be contracted to 
manage services such as primary care and hospital 
facilities on behalf of the public sector. A number 
of studies of contractual arrangements suggest 
that nongovernmental organizations working 
under contract to manage district services have 
increased service delivery in previously under-
served areas in some countries.27 There is much 
less evidence of the value of contracting for-profit 
providers, although studies from South Africa sug-
gest that the state must have the capacity to de-
sign and manage the contracts.28
The engagement of the private sector remains 
a topic of considerable controversy, seen by some 
as inviting the privatization of health care and 
making it a commodity.29 However, when the ca-
pacity of the public sector is limited and there is 
a concentration of human resources in the pri-
vate sector, seeking a mix of public and private 
provision of services can be seen as a pragmatic 
response. For example, current proposals for na-
tional health insurance in South Africa call for a 
system in which public financing is used to pur-
chase a comprehensive package of services from 
accredited public and private providers.30
A  L ong -Ter m Pro cess  
of De v el opmen t
On the basis of the evidence presented above, few 
clear-cut conclusions can be drawn with regard 
to the best strategies for strengthening countries’ 
health care systems. An approach that works well 
in one country may work less well in another, 
and not all approaches are equally acceptable to 
all governments or their multiple constituencies. 
There is no one blueprint for an ideal health care 
system, nor are there any magic bullets that will 
automatically elicit improved performance. This 
is hardly surprising: health care systems are com-
plex social systems,31 and the success of any one 
approach will depend on the system into which it 
is intended to fit as well as on its consistency 
with local values and ideologies.
A recent historical study of the contribution of 
the health care system to improved health in five 
countries identified a number of characteristics of 
successful health care systems (see Table 2).32 Such 
systems were able to develop the capacity to select 
promising strategies and to learn from the efforts 
Table 2. Characteristics of Successful Health Systems.
Have vision and long-term strategies
Take into account the constraints imposed by history and 
previous decisions (path dependency)
Build consensus at the societal level
Allow flexibility and autonomy in decision-making
Are resilient and learn from experience, feeding back  
into the policy cycle
Receive support from the broader governance and  
socioeconomic context and are in harmony with the 
culture and population preferences
Achieve synergies among sectors and actors
Demonstrate openness to dialogue and collaboration be-
tween public and private sectors, with effective gov-
ernment oversight
Adapted from Balabanova et al.32
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of other countries as well as from their own ex-
perimentation. The strengthening of a health care 
system requires a focus not only on specific strat-
egies, such as those considered above, but also on 
the creation of an environment that supports in-
novation. Health care strengthening must thus be 
seen as a long-term process that involves complex 
systems and requires carefully orchestrated action 
on a number of fronts. The global community can 
help by supporting country-led processes of re-
form and by helping to create a stronger evidence 
base that contributes to cross-country learning.
Disclosure forms provided by the author are available with the 
full text of this article at NEJM.org.
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